An officer may approach a citizen and have a consensual conversation and
ask questions without any level of suspicion—as long as no detention is involved.
An officer/citizen contact remains “voluntary” as long as the officer does not
restrict the freedom of the citizen, either by physical conduct or verbal direction.
Another question courts consider in assessing the voluntariness of an officer/citizen
contact is whether a reasonable person would feel free to turn and walk away
from the encounter. As long as a reasonable person believes that he or she can
“disregard the police and go about his or her business,” the encounter remains
voluntary.
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). If a reasonable person in similar
circumstances would not feel free to leave, then the encounter has turned into a
“seizure.”
United States v. Ringold, 335 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2003),
cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1026 (2003). Simply asking a citizen for identification, without any
command or show of force, remains a voluntary encounter.
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial
Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (“In the ordinary
course a police officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating
the Fourth Amendment.”);
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002). “A
police officer does not have to inform the citizen they are free to disregard any
further questioning for the encounter to be consensual.”
United States v. Manjarrez,
348 F.3d 881 (10th Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 541 U.S. 911 (2004).
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that mere questioning by police
does not create a detention.
Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005). The Supreme
Court upheld the officers’ questioning of Mena, whom they were detaining while
officers executed a search warrant in her residence. Officers asked Mena questions
about her immigration status during a search for weapons and suspects connected
to a shooting. The lower court ruled that the officers were required to have
independent reasonable suspicion in order to question her about her immigration
status because her status was not related to the purpose of the search warrant. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that “mere police questioning does not constitute
a seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. “Even when officers have no basis for
suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that
individual; ask to examine the individual’s identification; and request consent to
search his or her luggage.” Though Mena was detained and handcuffed for
approximately three hours, the questioning about her immigration status did not
prolong her detention and did not create an additional seizure. Therefore, no
independent reasonable suspicion was required to support the questioning. The
Court relied on its decision in
Illinois v. Caballes, wherein the Court ruled that
conducting a drug detector dog sniff during a traffic stop does not violate the
Fourth Amendment if it does not extend the stop beyond the time normally required
to complete the purpose of the original detention.
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405 (2005).
For example, an officer walks up to a group of high school students at a
football game, suspicious that some of the students may have been throwing
water balloons into the crowd. The officer greets the students and asks their names.
As long as the officer does not do anything such as block the exit path, give
nonverbal signals of detention, or use command language, the encounter remains
voluntary. The officer may ask the students if they were involved in the balloon
tossing or if they have any information, and still no detention will be created.
If the officer approaches the students and tells them not them not to move, or
waves them to stop or come toward him, the officer has exercised enough control
that the encounter may well be ruled a seizure. Thus, reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity will be required to make the detention lawful. The difference
between seizure and voluntary encounter, as well as the difference between
encouraging cooperation or generating hostility, often depends on the officer’s
tone and language. Remember: you can be perfectly tactically aware with a
smile on your face!
Alright, so only three of your cited cases even involve Federal LEOs, Drayton and Manjarrez amd Ringold.
But you’re devoted to not understanding that difference, as you consistently conflate local, state and federal LEO as if they all play by exactly the same rules, have exactly the same jurisdictions.
You’re also sticking to a framework mostly built around what constitutes a permissible search or seizure … which… is not what we are talking about, we are talking about whether or not federal LEO can approach someone violating a local traffic law, who is otherwise not directly related to the law enforcement action they are presumably (we still don’t actually know) undertaking.
And only Cabelles and Ringold, as best I can tell, involves an actual traffic stop, the general context of a check on someone currently in a vehicle.
Drayton? Everyone is already inside a bus. Not federal LEOs dismounting their vehicle with specific intent to approach a citizen in their own vehicle.
Manjarrez? They’re detaining someone they suspect is themselves violating or had violated an immigration law, not some unrelated rando.
Ringold? Traffic stop by a federal LEO against a person suspected of violating federal law, not an unrelated rando violating a local traffic law.
Cabelles? No federal LEO involved.
So you’re just throwing spaghetti at a wall and hoping some of it will stick.
What you’d have to do is argue that Terry or Hensley just generally apply to all federal LEO, anywhere, all the time, as well as all of the local traffic laws of wherever they currently happen to be.
… Which would functionally formally turn them into the Gestapo, able to stop anyone at any time for any kind of reasonable suspicion of violating any traffic law, potentially any local law, or that they had in the past violated basically any law, ever.
If you passed a bar exam, that’s a terrifying indictment of whichever bar you passed.
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba-cms-dotorg/products/inv/book/400713906/chapter-excerpt-5090173.pdf
Voluntary Encounters
Street contacts
An officer may approach a citizen and have a consensual conversation and ask questions without any level of suspicion—as long as no detention is involved. An officer/citizen contact remains “voluntary” as long as the officer does not restrict the freedom of the citizen, either by physical conduct or verbal direction. Another question courts consider in assessing the voluntariness of an officer/citizen contact is whether a reasonable person would feel free to turn and walk away from the encounter. As long as a reasonable person believes that he or she can “disregard the police and go about his or her business,” the encounter remains voluntary.
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). If a reasonable person in similar circumstances would not feel free to leave, then the encounter has turned into a “seizure.” United States v. Ringold, 335 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1026 (2003). Simply asking a citizen for identification, without any command or show of force, remains a voluntary encounter. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (“In the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment.”); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002). “A police officer does not have to inform the citizen they are free to disregard any further questioning for the encounter to be consensual.” United States v. Manjarrez, 348 F.3d 881 (10th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 911 (2004).
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that mere questioning by police does not create a detention. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005). The Supreme Court upheld the officers’ questioning of Mena, whom they were detaining while officers executed a search warrant in her residence. Officers asked Mena questions about her immigration status during a search for weapons and suspects connected to a shooting. The lower court ruled that the officers were required to have independent reasonable suspicion in order to question her about her immigration status because her status was not related to the purpose of the search warrant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. “Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; ask to examine the individual’s identification; and request consent to search his or her luggage.” Though Mena was detained and handcuffed for approximately three hours, the questioning about her immigration status did not prolong her detention and did not create an additional seizure. Therefore, no independent reasonable suspicion was required to support the questioning. The Court relied on its decision in Illinois v. Caballes, wherein the Court ruled that conducting a drug detector dog sniff during a traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment if it does not extend the stop beyond the time normally required to complete the purpose of the original detention. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
For example, an officer walks up to a group of high school students at a football game, suspicious that some of the students may have been throwing water balloons into the crowd. The officer greets the students and asks their names. As long as the officer does not do anything such as block the exit path, give nonverbal signals of detention, or use command language, the encounter remains voluntary. The officer may ask the students if they were involved in the balloon tossing or if they have any information, and still no detention will be created.
If the officer approaches the students and tells them not them not to move, or waves them to stop or come toward him, the officer has exercised enough control that the encounter may well be ruled a seizure. Thus, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity will be required to make the detention lawful. The difference between seizure and voluntary encounter, as well as the difference between encouraging cooperation or generating hostility, often depends on the officer’s tone and language. Remember: you can be perfectly tactically aware with a smile on your face!
Alright, so only three of your cited cases even involve Federal LEOs, Drayton and Manjarrez amd Ringold.
But you’re devoted to not understanding that difference, as you consistently conflate local, state and federal LEO as if they all play by exactly the same rules, have exactly the same jurisdictions.
You’re also sticking to a framework mostly built around what constitutes a permissible search or seizure … which… is not what we are talking about, we are talking about whether or not federal LEO can approach someone violating a local traffic law, who is otherwise not directly related to the law enforcement action they are presumably (we still don’t actually know) undertaking.
And only Cabelles and Ringold, as best I can tell, involves an actual traffic stop, the general context of a check on someone currently in a vehicle.
Drayton? Everyone is already inside a bus. Not federal LEOs dismounting their vehicle with specific intent to approach a citizen in their own vehicle.
Manjarrez? They’re detaining someone they suspect is themselves violating or had violated an immigration law, not some unrelated rando.
Ringold? Traffic stop by a federal LEO against a person suspected of violating federal law, not an unrelated rando violating a local traffic law.
Cabelles? No federal LEO involved.
So you’re just throwing spaghetti at a wall and hoping some of it will stick.
What you’d have to do is argue that Terry or Hensley just generally apply to all federal LEO, anywhere, all the time, as well as all of the local traffic laws of wherever they currently happen to be.
… Which would functionally formally turn them into the Gestapo, able to stop anyone at any time for any kind of reasonable suspicion of violating any traffic law, potentially any local law, or that they had in the past violated basically any law, ever.
If you passed a bar exam, that’s a terrifying indictment of whichever bar you passed.