I’m the Never Ending Pie Throwing Robot, aka NEPTR.
Linux enthusiast, programmer, and privacy advocate. I’m nearly done with an IT Security degree.
TL;DR I am a nerd.
That (curating communities) isnt censorship (in most cases), it is simply moderation. Not all restrictions on speech are censorship. It isnt censorship to ban yelling fire in movie theater, neither is it censorship to stop hate speech or threats of violence. Regulations on speech are not always censorship.
I however still think it is stupid to ban the word microslop. It doesnt hurt anyone.
You can run Genshin Impact on Linux
And it’s Linus’s distro of choice.
Screensharing is the only thing i dont think it does. Voice and video good. See snikket or conversations.im
Snap has a far better permission system and avoids many of the security pitfalls of Flatpak, but it being hardcoded to use Canonical’s proprietary server is BS. Also forcing people to use Snap is BS.
Yes, I understand what GVisor does. Cgroups2 are for isolation of system resources, bit arent even the main sandbox feature used for isolation by Docker. I am pretty sure namespaces significantly more important for these containers’ security.
GVisor helps with one of the main risks in a container setup which is the shared kernel by hosts and guests. I understand it comes with a performance penalty (and I didnt know it was incompatible with SELinux), but that does change my original point that GVisor is a security improvement to default Docker. I understand there is more nuance, even when I wrote my original comment I understood (just like any other security feature) it cant be used in every scenario. I was being intentionally general, and in my second comment I was pretty specific about what it protects against: Kernel vulnerabilities and privilege escalation.
I researched cgroups2 more and I still dont understand why you brought it up in the first place. Cgroups2 and gvisor provide very different security benefits. Cgroups help to keep a system available (lessening the risk DoS attacks) by controlling access to some system resources (io, devices, cpu, memory) and grouping processes of a similar type. It seems rather optimized to solve resource control on a container host. I mentioned gvisor because it is mostly just a drop-in replacement container runtime which doesnt need setup to be used.s
Now for a different container runtime which provides significantly more features (than gvisor) with less downsides (if configured correctly for a specific workload), Sydbox provides syd-oci which id an application kernel runtime which uses a permission config file to create a sandbox, isolating using namespaces, seccomp, landlock, and more. It can sandbox in many different categories (often times leveraging multiple features to provide a multilayer sandbox), you can see the categories at the syd manpage. The biggest downside is that you must really understand what your container application needs otherwise it will prevent it from running. It is a “secure by-default” sandbox which can be softened through config.
I dont really understand what you mean in your last sentence.
My reason for saying GVisor is safer is because it is an application kernel which provides traps and emulates most Linux syscalls in the guest with a far smaller set of syscalls to the host kernel, helping to prevent container escapes and privilege escalation. GVisor also fully drops privileges early into start up (before running any significant logic), helping to prevent privilege escalation.
Cgroups is not a really a security feature (from what I understand). It is about controlling process priority, hierarchy, and resources limiting (among other things). You can not use GVisor with LXC.
In order of most to least secure
VM > Docker+GVisor > Docker/LXC
Docker+GVisor is good middle ground because it provides the guest container with an application kernel in a memory safe language and reduced syscall attack surface to avoid kernel container escapes. Docker/LXC share the kernel with the host.
Alpine is minimal. That kid would show up in one piece pajamas because it serves the job of pants, shirt, underwear, and sweater+hood (if it comes with a hood).
The other problem with Matrix for me is that Element call (the protocol) is not present in most public instances and isn’t very straightforward to selfhost. The default is jitsi which is not E2EE. Pretty major IMO because if Matrix is supposed to be a Discord alternative and supposedly E2EE but VC isnt encrypted, pretty yikes.
Also they have claimed for years that they have forward secrecy. Has something actually changed recently?
Where did you read that Signal uses MLS? I could not find any claims of using MLS on Signal’s specs page or their GitHub repo. Also MLS doesn’t mean anything on its own, see Soatok’s blog on MLS.
Soatok is currently in the process of writing a blog post about another vulneribilty they found in Matrix’s encryption, and with Matrix’s history of numerous vulnerabilities, I would stay away from that shit. No matter how “good” the algorithm is in theory, it is all about implementation. Matrix also has very brittle encryption, often times many messages will become unrecoverable, which is terrible UX.
You’d be better off just selfhosting XMPP+OMEMO, with the caveat that it is also flawed and leaks plenty of metadata.
The best alternatives to Signal (but not Discord) are SimpleX and Briar. Both are significantly better than XMPP/Matrix for privacy and security.
It was her estranged spouse though. The astronaut didn’t commit the crime. I get that you are joking.
It still isnt great. Better than DeltaChat/Matrix but decently worse than Signal’s security.
OMEMO is better than nothing. Much better than OTR or PGP (looking at you DeltaChat), and the biggest problem seems to be the metadata and old versions used in some clients. The encryption (of message contents) at the very least is decent.
OMEMO is better than Matrix’s encryption, which the later doesnt offer proper forward secrecy and breaks all the time leaving messages inaccessible.
You can use the WebCord app for Spacebar.
Why is Artix in the schizo tier? It is a pretty awesome project.
While I agree snapper (what CachyOS uses) I very useful, it is important to draw a distinction between snapshots (snapper) and a proper backup tool (borg or restic). Snapshots are usually stored on the same drive, so in the event of a drive failure/corruption you are still very fucked. Proper backup programs also have other important features, like the ability to select remote locations, setup encryption, etc. DO NOT rely on snapper to (always) save your ass.
That being said, I fucking love snapper and it was the main feature I was missing from openSUSE.
/e/OS doesn’t care take security seriously. They are usually 1-2 months behind on Android security patches, leaving users vulnerable to literally (literally) dozens of critical and many more high severity vulnerabilities. Every other Android ROM is better about this. LineageOS and GrapheneOS are the best about updating quickly.