Explanation: Fuck me, strap in, this is a wild ride.

Alright, shortest possible version of events: Rojava is an ethnically Kurdish dominated polity in northeast Syria that formed during the war against the Assad regime. Despite being Kurdish, it officially proclaimed, and to at least some degree provided, ethnic equality with Arabs and other Syrian minorities. On top of that, it was a radical and decentralized leftist initiative with significant success, both military and economic.

Nonetheless, it is a relatively small part of Syria, and many of the outlaying regions, dominated by Syrian Arabs, were not particular partisans of Rojava so much as reluctant to return under the Assad regime. When the Assad regime fell, many in Rojava were shocked that many of these people were happy to return to the more ‘traditional’ central government instead of keeping with the great project which had provided security and economic survival in a period of chaos.

After a period of tension, an agreement was reached between the central government, itself unsteady and exercising only loose control over the various militias that made up the Syrian Civil War, and Rojava. In it, Rojava was guaranteed a certain level of autonomy, and would have Rojava officers placed in high spots in the new national Syrian army. In addition, Rojava would be given control over several mid-sized military units to staff and organize as they saw fit. It was less than Rojava originally aimed for, but for a time it seemed like a compromise both sides could live with.

After a series of attacks by local militias on Rojava, Rojava accused the central government of manipulating local militias to attack them, and demanded more robust security guarantees from the central government. The central government responded with denials and accusations that Rojava was just seeking to escalate its claims during a period of instability, with Israel bombing Syria and using Druze militias in the south to attack the central Syrian government. There have been constant skirmishes since, with neither side looking particularly interested in restarting any kind of civil war so much as attempting to bluster the other side into backing down.

With the new Syrian government interested in good relations with the US, it’s likely that Rojava, which previously enjoyed US support, would be in a stronger position… only the Trump regime came out and said that it has no interest in Rojava. Which is unsurprising, since Trump pushed hard to abandon the Kurds in Syria during his first term too.

Over the past few days, Arab militias in many outlying Arab majority areas of Rojava have risen up and, in the course of fighting with Rojava’s forces, caused them to withdraw, primarily by the rapid and unexpected positioning of militia fighters rather than prolonged combat. The forces of Rojava have withdrawn primarily to consolidate and form a plan that doesn’t involve entire units of their’s being surrounded by hostile militias, which is a very bad position to be in, rather than being battered or beaten back. The central government took the withdrawal of Rojava as an opportunity to take large amounts of those outlying areas without firing a shot.

Whether the central government was always fucking with Rojava and stalling for time and the militias are legitimately catspaws of the government, or Rojava overplayed its hand in rejecting implementing the compromise it originally agreed to is largely a matter of opinion.

Forgive me for such a ‘neutral’ position, but I’m of the opinion that both sides had entirely justified mistrust towards one another. The central government is probably enthusiastically taking this opportunistically to ‘reclaim’ the territory for central government control instead of ‘giving up’ autonomy to the region. However, they also may not have instigated local militias, many of which had previously quarreled with Rojava, the original cause of nonimplementation of the compromise agreement, as their ‘control’ over the country is nominal at best, and doubly so when regarding the many local militia forces who have loosely reaffiliated themselves with the successful central government after Assad’s fall.

What looks certain at this point is that Rojava’s bargaining position is much reduced, and the government may feel its own hand is strong enough now to not bother trying to negotiate a second compromise. This is an extremely sad day for leftist hopes and dreams. Rojava was extremely successful and built on high ideals, which it largely lived up to. At best, its influence will be greatly reduced compared to what it was looking like before. At worst, the Syrian central government will dismantle it entirely.

Maybe I’m just ignorant and/or snorting copium but isn’t it better for them to have consolidated their forces / be less overextended? At least in the short-term to medium-term? Besides, isn’t the northeastern area they still control the part of Syria that’s majority Kurdish (aka their “heartland” where they enjoy the most popular support")?