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Cake day: January 4th, 2024

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  • You do know that uranium oxide is water soluble right? The ocean has more radioactive material in it than the land does, also water is very good at blocking radiation. That’s why it’s used for spent fuel cooling pools.

    So the physics says that if you’re going to have fallout, the ocean is the best place for it. Provided that the fallout doesn’t float. Then it will most likely end up washing up on the shores of Japan.

    The key here is that the bombs available in 1950 were orders of magnitude weaker than modern nukes.

    Castle Brovo alone was stronger than every bomb from the MacArthur plan combined.

    Using hundreds of Castle Brovo sized bombs would fuck up the world, using the bombs MacArthur had access to? Not as much.






  • For MacArthur, that plan, while horrific, wasn’t as bad as you’re painting it, if only because the bombs would have been much lower yield than modern nukes.

    It would kill millions, especially if he used ground burst instead of air burst, but the actual global effect would be negligible. Cancer rates would spike in Northern Japan, but the fallout would mostly be over water.

    Air burst would have even less effect, because there would be no fallout. (fallout is stuff from the ground that gets mixed with the radioactive material and free neutrons in a ground burst nuclear explosion, it’s heavy so it falls out)

    Still an insane plan and MacArthur was justly fired for it and a bunch of other similar insanity, I just wish the Dulles brothers had been similarly fired for the shit they pulled.


  • Oh, you want 20th century again? You didn’t like it in my original comment, but back to Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, proven definitively in 1950.

    Arrow’s impossibility theorem is a key result in social choice theory showing that no ranked-choice procedure for group decision-making can satisfy the requirements of rational choice.[1] Specifically, American economist Kenneth Arrow showed no such rule can satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives, the principle that a choice between two alternatives A and B should not depend on the quality of some third, unrelated option, C.[2][3][4]

    The result is often cited in discussions of voting rules,[5] where it shows no ranked voting rule can eliminate the spoiler effect.[6][7][8] This result was first shown by the Marquis de Condorcet, whose voting paradox showed the impossibility of logically-consistent majority rule; Arrow’s theorem generalizes Condorcet’s findings to include non-majoritarian rules like collective leadership or consensus decision-making.[1]

    Then a bit later, this important part;

    Rated voting rules, where voters assign a separate grade to each candidate, are not affected by Arrow’s theorem.[17][18][19] Arrow initially asserted the information provided by these systems was meaningless and therefore could not be used to prevent paradoxes, leading him to overlook them.[20] However, Arrow would later describe this as a mistake,[21][22] admitting rules based on cardinal utilities (such as score and approval voting) are not subject to his theorem.[23][24]

    The Spoiler Effect is when a voting system fails independence of irrelevant alternatives. This is what drives two party dominance, after all, if you’re punished for voting third party, third parties become actively harmful. This is why the major support for most third parties comes from their ideological opponents. Jill Stein being super cozy with Russia and Republican donors being the key recent example.


  • I’m falling for the mathematical truth.

    We’ve known that Ordinal voting was bad since the 1780s, The Mathematician, philosopher and Girondian, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, the Marquis de Condorcet, wrote the seminal work on it; Essay on the Application of Analysis to the Probability of Majority Decisions (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix). Found here in the original French

    We haven’t fixed anything, because the voting method itself is broken. In any First Past the Post election, you have the Spoiler Effect, where just a few votes for a third party can guarantee that the person furthest from that candidate on the political spectrum wins. Look at Ross Perot securing Clinton’s win in 1992 and Ralph Nader securing Bush’s win in 2000.

    None of that shit is fixed because we’re still using the broken system, a system that wasn’t actually ever really designed as such, it was just the default easiest way to do things and enables minority rule.


  • It’s a consequence of Ordinal voting methods, particularly First Past the Post.

    Arrow’s Impossibility Theorium spells it out. https://electowiki.org/wiki/Arrow’s_impossibility_theorem

    The tldr is that any ranked voting system will result in two parties.

    This is really because all ranked voting systems are built around the word “Or”.

    You support A or B. Which means that A and B have incentive to demonize each other, because every vote for A is one less potential vote for B.

    The solution is abandoning Ordinal voting for a Cardinal system.

    The simplest method is Approval.

    Approval voting is a single-winner electoral system where each voter may select (“approve”) any number of candidates. The winner is the candidate approved by the largest number of voters. It is distinct from plurality voting, in which a voter may choose only one option among several (where the option with the most selections is declared the winner). It is related to score voting in which voters give each option a score on a scale, and the option with the highest total of scores is selected.

    Another option is STAR.

    www.starvoting.org

    It’s been deliberately designed to make for better election results.


  • Some of those criterion are odd, and yeah, most don’t even apply to STAR, because it’s Cardinal and not Ordinal.

    Bit it’s also important to know why and how the criterion are applied.

    Like being cloneproof,

    This wiki, (which is better for election specific stuff) says this;

    STAR voting

    STAR voting consists of an automatic runoff between the two candidates with the highest rated scores. Suppose we use the rated definition of cloning, where a candidate’s clones have scores nearly identical to the candidate who was cloned. If the winner in STAR voting differs from the Range voting winner, then cloning the latter will make him or her win. Therefore, STAR voting has a teaming incentive.

    A bit later is says this;

    Notes

    Clone-negative methods can be argued to be better than clone-positive methods, because in a clone-negative methods, the clones may be more likely to drop out of the election, giving voters more of a say on the remaining candidates, whereas with clone-positive methods, the election result can come down primarily to which candidates run more clones of themselves. Such behavior has been observed with the Borda count.[6]

    It’s a weakness, and it’s important to know about, but it’s not election breaking, it just renders the automatic runoff meaningless. Except it doesn’t because people still care about the who, even if the platforms are identical.

    An election breaking criterion to fail would be Monotonicity. STAR satisfies it.